Defending Juveniles Facing Life Without Parole in Michigan

In Graham v. Florida, the United State Supreme Court held that life without parole could not be imposed on a juvenile offender for a non-homicide crime. This article discusses the challenges, under the Eighth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution, to the sentence of life without parole imposed on someone 17 years old or less

What Does Graham Mean in Michigan?

In Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court held that life without parole could not be imposed on a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide crime.1 In this context, the Graham Court extensively discussed the diminished culpability of juvenile criminal defendants, as compared to adults. The Court relied on current scientific research regarding adolescent development and neuroscience. While the narrowest holding of Graham has little impact in Michigan, the science it relies on, and the potential broader implications for adolescents in Michigan, are significant

Reconsidering Ross: The Interplay of AEDPA, Criminal Appeals, and The Right to Counsel

This piece highlights features of our current law that converge to say that we should reconsider Ross: (1) the utility of counsel on discretionary review, which has been underexplored, both before and after Ross; (2) the increased importance, in modern criminal law, of direct appeals; and relatedly, the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of AEDPA that has moved most of the significant windows for substantive criminal law change into the direct appeal; and, finally, (3) perhaps an increased sliver of doctrinal sunlight in which to think about chipping away at Ross. Given the first two developments, the possible window to think of shifting the doctrine comes at an opportune time. This article first provides the background on Ross and the law of appellate right to counsel, then explores each of these in turn

Substantive Habeas

Substantive Habeas identifies the US. Supreme Court\u27s recent shift in its habeas jurisprudence from procedure to the substance of habeas review and explores the implications of this change. For decades, the US. Supreme Court has attempted to control the flood of habeas corpus petitions by imposing procedural requirements on prisoners seeking to challenge constitutional error in their cases. These restrictive procedural rules have remained at the center of habeas decision making until recently. Over the past few years, instead of further constraining the procedural gateway for habeas cases, the Supreme Court has shifted its focus to the substance of habeas. The result is a narrowing of the substantive window through which habeas petitioners must pass. This important shift to restrictive substantive habeas has not been explored in the scholarly literature and is changing the terms of habeas litigation. This nascent move is not without ripple effects. To flesh out possible implications, Substantive Habeas posits a hypothetical habeas case that, under the Court\u27s current restrictive substantive habeas law, turns procedural doctrine on its head and creates perverse incentives for state prisoners. What is missing from the Court\u27s move to substantive habeas is a clear explanation of how the substantive and the procedural aspects of habeas fit together. Taking as a given that the Court has narrowed the procedural door to habeas relief largely in the name of comity and federalism, Substantive Habeas suggests a complementary explanation for substantive habeas grounded in institutional capacity and expertis

What Does Graham Mean in Michigan?

In Graham v. Florida, the United States Supreme Court held that life without parole could not be imposed on a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide crime.1 In this context, the Graham Court extensively discussed the diminished culpability of juvenile criminal defendants, as compared to adults. The Court relied on current scientific research regarding adolescent development and neuroscience. While the narrowest holding of Graham has little impact in Michigan, the science it relies on, and the potential broader implications for adolescents in Michigan, are significant

Mich. Ruling Widens Sentencing Protections For Young Adults

On July 28, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the mandatory imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on an 18-year-old violated the state constitution. This decision expands the protections provided for young defendants by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama and builds on a nascent trend that provides additional constitutional and statutory protections for young people over 17 years old who are charged with serious offenses

Juvenile Life Without Parole: Unconstitutional in Michigan?

Last term, in Graham v Florida,1 the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional the sentence of life without parole for a juvenile who committed a non-homicide offense. This attention to the sentencing of juvenile offenders is a continuation of the Court\u27s decision in Roper v Simmons,2 in which the Court held that juvenile offenders could not constitutionally receive the death penalty. This scrutiny should be a signal to Michigan to examine its own jurisprudence on juveniles receiving sentences of life without parole. Michigan has the second-highest number of persons serving sentences of life without parole for offenses committed when they were 17 years old or younger.3 Michigan\u27s constitution, article 1, §16, provides broader protection than the federal constitution under its analogous ban on cruel or unusual punishment. Further, the confluence of several, separately passed, statutes means that, in many cases, juveniles sentenced to life without parole in Michigan will never have a judge assess anything about their individual culpability, maturity, or relative role in the offense

Substantive Habeas

Substantive Habeas identifies the US. Supreme Court\u27s recent shift in its habeas jurisprudence from procedure to the substance of habeas review and explores the implications of this change. For decades, the US. Supreme Court has attempted to control the flood of habeas corpus petitions by imposing procedural requirements on prisoners seeking to challenge constitutional error in their cases. These restrictive procedural rules have remained at the center of habeas decision making until recently. Over the past few years, instead of further constraining the procedural gateway for habeas cases, the Supreme Court has shifted its focus to the substance of habeas. The result is a narrowing of the substantive window through which habeas petitioners must pass. This important shift to restrictive substantive habeas has not been explored in the scholarly literature and is changing the terms of habeas litigation. This nascent move is not without ripple effects. To flesh out possible implications, Substantive Habeas posits a hypothetical habeas case that, under the Court\u27s current restrictive substantive habeas law, turns procedural doctrine on its head and creates perverse incentives for state prisoners. What is missing from the Court\u27s move to substantive habeas is a clear explanation of how the substantive and the procedural aspects of habeas fit together. Taking as a given that the Court has narrowed the procedural door to habeas relief largely in the name of comity and federalism, Substantive Habeas suggests a complementary explanation for substantive habeas grounded in institutional capacity and expertis

Interpersonal Power in the Criminal System

This Article identifies the workings of interpersonal power in the criminal system and considers the effect of these cases on criminal theory and practice. By uncovering this phenomenon, this Article hopes to spark a legal academic dialogue and inquiry that has, until now, been unspoken. This Article has roots in my former work as a Philadelphia public defender and in my current work as a clinical professor with students who appear in criminal and juvenile court. As an advocate for the poor in a busy courthouse, one of a lawyer\u27s tasks is to discover the multiple real stories behind the charges and test alternative hypotheses for what may have occurred in a given situation. I am constantly struck by the courts\u27 and criminal law\u27s inability to account for the role of interpersonal power. Part I gives a contextual overview of features of the current criminal and civil justice system that suggest people, and poor people in particular, might seek access to the criminal justice system as a way to exert interpersonal power usually associated more with the civil justice system. Among other things, these background conditions include the difficulty of accessing civil legal assistance and social services for mental illness and substance abuse. Part II examines the theoretical and doctrinal problems these cases pose for criminal law. In particular, these cases fit within a literature that shows a growing discomfort with both the inability to draw a coherent line between civil and criminal justice systems as well as the ramifications of these new hybrid actions. The majority of the literature on this distinction focuses on regulatory and white-collar offenses. This Article is one of the first to highlight the blurring of criminal and civil law in the context of average criminal cases. In Part III, the Article examines the on the ground dilemmas, unseen by outside observers that are created by the presence of interpersonal power in the criminal justice system. Until interpersonal power is acknowledged, these practical implications will not be adequately addressed. Part III also explores several possible approaches for addressing these cases within both the criminal and civil systems

ECONOMIC THRESHOLDS: AN APPLICATION TO FLORICULTURE

This paper introduces conjunctive optimal pest management and production decision rules applied to the floriculture industry. A grower is faced with optimally controlling multiple pests and applying cultural controls to maximize the expected net present value of benefits within a discrete time framework, subject to biological and marketing constraints.Crop Production/Industries,